

**CABINET**  
**9 FEBRUARY 2021**

---

**PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS AND  
TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 2021/22**

---

**Responsible Cabinet Member –  
Councillor Charles Johnson, Resources Portfolio**

**Responsible Director –  
Paul Wildsmith, Managing Director**

---

**SUMMARY REPORT**

**Purpose of the Report**

1. This report requests Cabinet to review and scrutinise the following prior to forwarding to Council for their approval and adoption:
  - (a) The Prudential Indicators and Limits for 2021/22 to 2023/24 relating to capital expenditure and Treasury Management activity.
  - (a) A policy statement relating to the Minimum Revenue Provision.
  - (b) The Treasury Management Strategy 2021/22, which includes the Annual Investment Strategy for 2021/22
2. The report outlines the Council's prudential indicators for 2021/22 – 2023/24 and sets out the expected treasury operations for this period. It fulfils key legislative and guidance requirements:
  - (a) The reporting of the **prudential indicators** setting out the expected capital activities and treasury management prudential indicators included as treasury indicators in the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Treasury Management Code of Practice
  - (b) The Council's **Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Policy**, which sets out how the Council will pay for capital assets through revenue each year.
  - (c) The **treasury management strategy** statement which sets out how the Council's treasury service will support capital decisions taken above, the day to day treasury management and the limitations on activity through treasury prudential indicators.
  - (d) The key indicator is the **authorised limit**, the maximum amount of debt the Council could afford in the short term, but which is not sustainable in the longer term.

- (e) The **investment strategy** which sets out the Council's criteria for choosing the investment counterparties and limiting exposures to the risk of loss.
- 3. The information contained in the report regarding the Councils expenditure plans, Treasury Management and Prudential Borrowing activities indicate that they are:
  - (a) Within the statutory framework and consistent with the relevant codes of practice.
  - (b) Prudent, affordable and sustainable.
  - (c) An integral part of the Council's Revenue and Capital Medium Term Financial Plans.

### **Recommendation**

- 4. It is recommended that Cabinet recommends the following for approval by Council:
  - (a) The Prudential Indicators and limits for 2021/22 to 2023/24 summarised in Tables 1 and 2.
  - (b) The Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) statement (paragraphs 33 - 37).
  - (c) The Treasury Management Strategy 2021/22 to 2023/24 as summarised in paragraphs 41 to 69.
  - (d) The Annual Investment Strategy 2021/22 contained in paragraphs 70 to 107.

### **Reasons**

- 5. The recommendations are supported by the following reasons:
  - (a) In order to comply with the Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities and the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) guidance on investments.
  - (b) To comply with the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003.
  - (c) To approve a framework for officers to work within when making investment decisions.

**Paul Wildsmith**  
**Managing Director**

### **Background Papers**

- (i) Annual Statement of Account 2019/20
- (ii) Draft Capital Strategy (incl Capital MTFP 2021/22 to 2024/25)
- (iii) Link Asset Services Economic Report Dec 2020

S17 Crime and Disorder	This report has no implications for S 17 Crime and Disorder.
Health and Well Being	This report has no implications for the Council's Health and Well being agenda.
Carbon Impact and Climate Change	This report has no implications for the Council's Carbon Emissions.
Diversity	This report has no implications for the Council's Diversity agenda.
Wards Affected	All Wards
Groups Affected	All Groups
Budget and Policy Framework	This report must be considered by Council.
Key Decision	This is not an executive decision
Urgent Decision	For the purposes of call in this report is not an urgent decision.
One Darlington: Perfectly Placed	This report has no particular implications for the sustainable Community Strategy.
Efficiency	The report refers to actions taken to reduce costs and manage risks.
Impact on Looked After Children and Care Leavers	This report has no impact on Looked After Children or Care Leavers.

## MAIN REPORT

### Information and Analysis

#### Background

6. CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*“The management of the local authority’s borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”*

7. The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council’s risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return
8. The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council’s capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.
9. The contribution the treasury management function makes to the Council is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.
10. Whilst any commercial initiatives or loans to third parties will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities, (arising usually from capital expenditure), and are separate from the day to day treasury management activities.

#### Reporting requirements

##### Capital Strategy

11. The 2017 CIPFA Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require all local authorities to prepare a capital strategy report, which will provide the following:
  - (a) a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services;
  - (b) an overview of how the associated risk is managed;

- (c) the implications for future financial sustainability.
- 12. The aim of the capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the full council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite. The Capital Strategy is reported separately to Cabinet and Council on an annual basis.

### **Treasury Management Reporting**

- 13. The Council is required by legislation to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

### **Prudential and Treasury Indicators and Treasury Strategy (this report)**

- 14. The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
  - (a) The capital plans (including prudential indicators);
  - (b) A minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
  - (c) The treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
  - (d) An investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

### **A Mid-Year Treasury Management Report**

- 15. This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether the treasury function is meeting the strategy or whether any policies require revision.

### **An Annual Treasury Report**

- 16. This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

### **Treasury Management Strategy for 2021/22**

- 17. The strategy for 2021/22 covers two main areas:
  - (a) Capital Issues:
    - (i) the capital expenditure plans and the prudential indicators;
    - (ii) the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.
  - (b) Treasury Management Issues:
    - (i) the current treasury position;
    - (ii) treasury indicators which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
    - (iii) prospects for interest rates;

- (iv) the borrowing strategy;
- (v) policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- (vi) debt rescheduling;
- (vii) the investment strategy;
- (viii) creditworthiness policy; and
- (ix) policy on use of external service providers.

18. These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and the MHCLG Investment Guidance.

19. A summary of the key prudential indicators and limits are contained in Tables 1 and 2 and further details are contained further on in this report.

**Table 1 – Capital Expenditure and Borrowing**

	<b>2020/21 Revised</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimated</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimated</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimated</b>
Capital Expenditure Tables 3 and 4	£28.793m	£43.326m	£38.271m	£36.237m
Capital financing requirement - Table 5	£218.318m	£229.504m	£242.402m	£253.543m
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream – General Fund See paragraph 39 - Table 6	2.76%	2.58%	2.65%	4.56%
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream – HRA See paragraph 39 - Table 6	13.21%	14.86%	16.20%	17.30%
Operational boundary for external debt - Table 9	£187.957m	£201.831m	£215.716m	£229.610m
Authorised limit for external debt - Table 10	£229.233m	£240.979m	£254.522m	£266.220m

**Table 2 – Treasury Management**

	<b>2021/22 Upper Limit</b>	<b>2022/23 Upper Limit</b>	<b>2023/24 Upper Limit</b>
<b>Limits on fixed interest rates</b>	100%	100%	100%
<b>Limits on variable interest rates</b>	40%	40%	40%
<b>Maximum principal sums invested &gt; 364 days</b>	£50m	£50m	£50m
<b>Maturity Structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2021/22</b>			
	<b>Lower Limit</b>	<b>Upper Limit</b>	
Under 12 months	0%	40%	
12 months to 2 years	0%	50%	
2 years to 5 years	0%	60%	
5 years to 10 years	0%	80%	
10 years and above	0%	100%	

## Training

20. The CIPFA code requires the responsible officer to ensure that Members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to Members responsible for scrutiny. Training was undertaken by a number of Members during a session held in December 2020 and further training will be arranged as required. The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

## Treasury Management Consultants

21. The Council uses Link Group, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors. The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service provider. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisors.
22. It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The officers of the Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented and subject to regular review.

## The Capital Prudential Indicators 2021/22– 2023/24

23. The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

## Capital Expenditure

24. This Prudential Indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

**Table 3 Capital Expenditure**

	<b>2020/21 Revised £m</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £m</b>
General Fund	22.520	22.395	14.149	14.149
HRA	7.590	20.449	21.704	20.971
<b>Estimated Capital Expenditure</b>	<b>30.110</b>	<b>42.844</b>	<b>35.853</b>	<b>35.120</b>
Loans to Joint Ventures	(1.317)	0.482	2.418	1.117
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.793</b>	<b>43.326</b>	<b>38.271</b>	<b>36.237</b>

25. The financing need above excludes other long-term liabilities, such as PFI and leasing arrangements which already include borrowing instruments.

26. The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

**Table 4 Financing of the Capital Programme**

	<b>2020/21 Revised £m</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £m</b>
General Fund	22.520	22.395	14.149	14.149
HRA	7.590	20.449	21.704	20.971
Loans to Joint Ventures	(1.317)	0.482	2.418	1.117
<b>Total Capital</b>	<b>28.793</b>	<b>43.326</b>	<b>38.271</b>	<b>36.237</b>
<b>Financed by:</b>				
Capital receipts -General Fund	1.357	1.150	0.400	0.400
Capital receipts - Housing	0.303	0.303	0.303	0.303
Capital grants	16.876	12.171	3.749	3.749
Self financing - GF	0.250	0.250	10.000	10.000
Revenue Contributions (Housing)	7.288	6.761	5.986	5.586
HRA Investment Fund	0.000	4.982	4.982	4.982
<b>Total excluding borrowing</b>	<b>26.074</b>	<b>25.617</b>	<b>25.420</b>	<b>25.020</b>
<b>Borrowing need</b>	<b>2.719</b>	<b>17.709</b>	<b>12.851</b>	<b>11.217</b>

### **The Council's Borrowing Need (the Capital Financing Requirement)**

27. The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for through a revenue or capital resource, will increase the CFR.
28. The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each assets' life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.
29. The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases) brought onto the balance sheet. Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility by the PFI or lease provider and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has £10.358m of such schemes within the CFR.
30. Under a new accounting standard (IFRS 16) the Council will be required to add any finance leases to its balance sheet and therefore increase its CFR accordingly, this standard was due to be introduced from 1 April 2021 but has been deferred to 1 April 2022 when the Council will include any identified elements on its balance sheet and hence increase its CFR.



31. Cabinet is asked to recommend for approval the CFR projections below:

**Table 5 – CFR Projections**

	<b>2020/21 Revised £m</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £m</b>
CFR – General Fund	126.994	129.802	132.401	134.658
CFR – PFI and Finance leases	10.358	9.232	8.117	7.011
CFR - housing	68.168	77.189	86.185	95.058
CFR - Loans to JV's	12.798	13.281	15.699	16.816
<b>Total CFR</b>	<b>218.318</b>	<b>229.504</b>	<b>242.402</b>	<b>253.543</b>
<b>Movement in CFR</b>		<b>11.186</b>	<b>12.898</b>	<b>11.141</b>

### **MRP Policy Statement**

32. The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP). It is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if desired (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).
33. MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision.
34. It is proposed that Darlington Borough Council's MRP policy statement for 2021/22 will be:
- (a) For Capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 and expenditure which was granted through credit approvals since that date MRP will be calculated on an annuity basis (2%) over 50 years or the useful life of the asset.
  - (b) Capital Expenditure from 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, repayments will be on an annuity basis (2%)
  - (c) Repayments relating to the PFI scheme will be based on the life of the asset of 60 years from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2008 on an annuity basis (2%).
  - (d) Where MRP has been overcharged in previous years, the recovery of the overcharge will be affected by reducing the MRP charges, due in full or in part for 2021/22 and in future years, which would otherwise have been made. The MRP adjustment for 2021/22 and in future years charge will be done in such a way as to ensure that:-
    - (i) the total MRP after applying the adjustment will not be less than zero in any financial year,
    - (ii) the cumulative amount adjusted for will never exceed the amount over-charged,
    - (iii) the extent of the adjustment will be reviewed on an annual basis.

35. There is no requirement on the HRA to make a minimum revenue provision but there is a requirement for a charge for depreciation to be made.
36. Repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP.

### **Affordability Prudential Indicators**

37. The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators.

### **Estimates of the ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream.**

38. This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long-term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

**Table 6 - Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream**

	<b>2020/21 Revised</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate</b>
General Fund	2.76%	2.58%	2.65%	4.56%
HRA	13.21%	14.86%	16.20%	17.30%

39. The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this year's MTFP report.

## **Treasury Management Strategy**

### **Borrowing**

40. The capital expenditure plans set out in the previous paragraphs provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

### **Under Borrowing position**

41. Over the last ten years the Council had maintained an underborrowed position i.e. the amount of our gross external borrowing has been less than our balance sheet Capital Financing Requirement. This strategy has served the Council well in a period where returns on investment have been low and borrowing costs have been relatively high. This has also meant that we have had less in the form of investments and so reduced counterparty risk. To support the MTFP it was agreed that longer term investments would be pursued as these would give a return over

and above the cost of any additional borrowing that would be taken. Following due diligence the Council has 3 Property Funds with £10 million in each fund and these are expected to bring a net return of around 1.5% over the life of the MTFP. Additional borrowing of £25m was undertaken which resulted in the underborrowed position being reduced.

### Current Portfolio Position

42. The overall treasury management portfolio as at 31 March 2020 and for the position as at 5 January 2021 are shown below for both borrowings and investments.

**Table 7 – Treasury Portfolio**

TREASURY PORTFOLIO				
	Actual 31/03/2020 £m's	Actual 31/03/2020 %	Current 31/12/2020 £m's	Current 31/12/2020 %
<b>Treasury Investments</b>				
banks	6.500	11.4	8.000	14.0
local authorities	10.000	17.6	10.000	17.5
money market funds	10.300	18.2	9.300	16.2
<b>Total managed in house</b>	<b>26.800</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>27.300</b>	<b>47.7</b>
property funds	29.999	52.8	29.999	52.3
<b>Total managed externally</b>	<b>29.999</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>29.999</b>	<b>52.3</b>
<b>Total treasury investments</b>	<b>56.799</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>57.299</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Treasury external borrowing</b>				
local authorities	40.000	22.0	25.000	15.0
PWLB	129.061	71.1	129.061	77.4
LOBO's	12.600	6.9	12.600	7.6
<b>Total external borrowing</b>	<b>181.661</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>166.661</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Net treasury borrowing</b>	<b>124.862</b>		<b>109.362</b>	

43. The Council's expected treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2021, with forward projections is summarised below at Table 8. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

**Table 8 - Gross Borrowing to CFR**

	<b>2020/21 Revised £m</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £m</b>
Debt at 31 March	162.801	177.318	189.900	203.783
Loans to Joint Ventures	12.798	13.281	15.699	16.816
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	10.358	9.232	8.117	7.011
<b>Gross Actual debt at 31 March</b>	<b>185.957</b>	<b>199.831</b>	<b>213.716</b>	<b>227.610</b>
<b>The Capital Financing Requirement from Table 5</b>	<b>218.318</b>	<b>229.504</b>	<b>242.402</b>	<b>253.543</b>
<b>Under / (over) borrowing</b>	<b>32.361</b>	<b>29.673</b>	<b>28.686</b>	<b>25.933</b>

44. Within the range of prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2021/22 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years but ensures that the borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.
45. The Assistant Director Resources reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and proposals within this budget report.

### **Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity**

#### **The Operational Boundary**

46. This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

**Table 9 - Operational Boundary**

	<b>2020/21 Revised £m</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £m</b>
Debt from Table 8 (incl JV's)	175.599	190.599	205.599	220.599
Other long-term liabilities	10.358	9.232	8.117	7.011
Prudential Borrowing for leasable assets	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Prudential Borrowing under Directors Delegated Powers	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
<b>Operational Boundary</b>	<b>187.957</b>	<b>201.831</b>	<b>215.716</b>	<b>229.610</b>

## The Authorised Limit for external debt

47. This is a key prudential indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term:
48. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
49. The Council's Authorised Limit is as follows:

**Table 10 – Authorised Limit**

	<b>2020/21 Revised £m</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £m</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £m</b>
CFR	218.318	229.504	242.402	253.543
Additional Headroom @ 5%	10.915	11.475	12.120	12.677
<b>Authorised Limit</b>	<b>229.233</b>	<b>240.979</b>	<b>254.522</b>	<b>266.220</b>

50. It is proposed that the additional headroom for years 2021/22 to 2023/24 is 5% above the CFR, this would allow for any additional cashflow needs throughout the years.

## Prospects for Interest Rates

51. The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives Link Asset Services's central view for future interest rates and the economic background to that view is shown at Appendix 1.

**Table 11 – Interest rates**

<b>Annual Average %</b>	<b>Bank Rate %</b>	<b>PWLB Borrowing Rates % (including *certainty rate adjustment)</b>			
		<b>5 year</b>	<b>10 year</b>	<b>25 year</b>	<b>50 year</b>
Mar 2021	0.10	0.80	1.10	1.50	1.30
Jun 2021	0.10	0.80	1.10	1.60	1.40
Sep 2021	0.10	0.80	1.10	1.60	1.40
Dec 2021	0.10	0.80	1.10	1.60	1.40
Mar 2022	0.10	0.90	1.20	1.60	1.40
Jun 2022	0.10	0.90	1.20	1.70	1.50
Sep 2022	0.10	0.90	1.20	1.70	1.50
Dec 2022	0.10	0.90	1.20	1.70	1.50
Mar 2023	0.10	0.90	1.20	1.70	1.50
Jun 2023	0.10	1.00	1.30	1.80	1.60

Sep 2023	0.10	1.00	1.30	1.80	1.60
Dec 2023	0.10	1.00	1.30	1.80	1.60
Mar 2024	0.10	1.00	1.30	1.80	1.60

*\* The certainty rate adjustment is a reduced rate by 0.20% for those councils like Darlington Borough Council who have submitted more detail on future borrowing requirement to the Treasury*

52. The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March to cut Bank Rate to first 0.25%, and then to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings to 5<sup>th</sup> November, although some forecasters had suggested that a cut into negative territory could happen. However, the Governor of the Bank of England has made it clear that he currently thinks that such a move would do more damage than good and that more quantitative easing is the favoured tool if further action becomes necessary. As shown in the forecast table above, no increase in Bank Rate is expected in the forecast table above as economic recovery is expected to be only gradual and, therefore, prolonged. These forecasts were based on an assumption that a Brexit trade deal would be agreed by 31.12.20; as this has now occurred, these forecasts do not need to be revised
53. As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is expected to be little upward movement in PWLB rates over the next two years as it will take economies, including the UK, a prolonged period to recover all the momentum they have lost in the sharp recession caused during the coronavirus shut down period. From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment, (as shown on 9th November when the first results of a successful COVID-19 vaccine trial were announced). Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

### **Investment and borrowing rates**

54. Investment returns are likely to remain exceptionally low during 2021/22 with little increase in the following 2 years.
55. Borrowing interest rates fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England: indeed, gilt yields up to 6 years were negative during most of the first half of 20/21. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.
56. While the Council will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure, to replace maturing debt and the rundown of reserves, there will be a cost of carry (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), so any new short or medium-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost.

### **Borrowing Strategy**

57. The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position although this has reduced from previous years. This means that the capital borrowing need (the

Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue to be considered.

58. Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2021/22 treasury operations. The Assistant Director Resources will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:
- (a) If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in borrowing rates (eg due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.
  - (b) If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.
59. Any decisions would be reported to the appropriate Committee at the next available opportunity.

### **Treasury Management Limits on Activity**

60. There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive, they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs/improve performance. The indicators are:
- (a) Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments
  - (b) Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
  - (c) Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing and are required for upper and lower limits. The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

**Table 12 Interest Rate Exposure**

	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Upper</b>
<b>Limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt</b>	100%	100%	100%
<b>Limits on variable interest rates based on net debt</b>	40%	40%	40%
<b>Maturity Structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2021/22</b>			
	<b>Lower</b>	<b>Upper</b>	
Under 12 months	0%	40%	
12 months to 2 years	0%	50%	
2 years to 5 years	0%	60%	
5 years to 10 years	0%	80%	
10 years and above	0%	100%	

**Policy on Borrowing in Advance of Need**

61. The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance of need will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds through its investment strategy.
62. Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

**Debt Rescheduling**

63. Rescheduling of current borrowing in our debt portfolio is unlikely to occur as the 100bps reduction in PWLB rates only applied to new borrowing rates and not to premature debt repayment rates.
64. If there was a possibility the reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:
- (a) the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
  - (b) helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
  - (c) enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).
65. Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.



66. If rescheduling was done it will be reported to Committee at the earliest meeting following its action.

### **New Financial Institutions as a source of borrowing**

67. Currently the PWLB Certainty Rate is set at gilts + 80 basis points for both HRA and Non-HRA borrowing. However, consideration may still need to be given to sourcing funding from the following sources for the following:
- (a) Local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities out to 3 years or so – still cheaper than the Certainty Rate);
  - (b) Financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks, out of forward dates where the objective is to avoid a 'cost of carry' or to achieve refinancing certainty over the next few years);
  - (c) Municipal Bond Agency (possibly still a viable alternative depending on market circumstances prevailing at the time).
68. Our advisors will keep us informed as to the relative merits of each of these alternative funding sources.

### **Annual Investment Strategy**

#### **Investment and Creditworthiness Policy**

69. The MHCLG and CIPFA have extended the meaning of 'investments' to include both financial and non-financial investments. This report deals solely with financial investments (as managed by the treasury management team). Non-financial investments, essentially the purchase of income yielding assets, are covered in the Capital Strategy.
70. The Council's investment policy has regard to the following:
- (a) MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance")
  - (b) CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the Code")
  - (c) CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018
71. The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second and then yield (return). The Council will aim to achieve the optimum return (yield) on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity and with the Council's risk appetite. In the current economic climate it is considered appropriate to keep investments short term to cover cash flow needs. However, where appropriate (from an internal as well as external perspective), the Council will also consider the value available in periods up to 12 months with high credit rated financial institutions, as well as wider range fund options.
72. The above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA place a high priority on the management of risk. This Council has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means:

- (a) Minimum acceptable credit criteria are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.
- (b) Other information: ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as 'credit default swaps' and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
- (c) Other information sources used will include the financial press, share prices and other such information pertaining to the financial sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.
- (d) This Council has defined the list of types of investment instruments that the treasury management team are authorised to use. There are 2 lists in **Appendix 2** under the categories of 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments.
  - (i) Specified investments are those with a high level of credit quality and subject to a maturity limit of one year.
  - (ii) Non-specified investments are those with less high credit quality, may be for periods in excess of one year, and/or are more complex instruments which require greater consideration by Members and officers before being authorised for use.
- (e) Lending limits, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the matrix table in Table 13.
- (f) Transaction limits are set for each type of investment in Table 13.
- (g) This Council will set a limit for the amount of its investments which are invested for longer than 365 days.
- (h) Investments will be placed with counterparties from countries with a specified minimum sovereign rating.
- (i) This Council has engaged external consultants, to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of this Council in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year.
- (j) All investments will be denominated in sterling.
- (k) As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2020/21 under International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9, this Council will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end

of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018 the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government [MHCLG], concluded a consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for 5 years ending 31 March 2023).

73. However, this Council will also pursue value for money in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance. Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

## **Investment Counterparty Selection Criteria**

### **Creditworthiness policy**

74. The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle the Council will ensure that:
- (a) It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and
  - (b) It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose, it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.
75. The Assistant Director Resources will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified (see appendix 2 for definitions) as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.
76. Credit rating information is supplied by the Link Group, our treasury advisors, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of a longer-term bias outside the central rating view) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating Watch applying to a counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.
77. Any investment in Property Funds/ Corporate Bond Funds/ Asset Backed Investment Products will be subject to due diligence for each and every fund considered. The maximum amount invested in any one fund will be £20million with a maximum of £50million total for all funds.

78. The criteria for providing a pool of high-quality investment counterparties (both specified and non-specified investments) is:

(a) Banks 1 - good credit quality – the Council will only use banks which:

- (i) are UK banks; and/or;
- (ii) are non-UK and domiciled in a country which has a minimum sovereign Long Term rating of AA-.

and have, as a minimum, the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors credit ratings (where rated):

- (i) Short Term – F1
- (ii) Long Term – A-

(b) Banks 2 – Part nationalised UK banks – Royal Bank of Scotland ring-fenced operations. These banks can be included provided they continue to be part nationalised or meet the ratings in Banks 1 above.

(c) Banks 3 – The Council's own banker for transactional purposes if the bank falls below the above criteria, although in this case balances will be minimised in both monetary size and time invested.

(d) Building societies -The Council will use all societies which meet the ratings for the banks outlined above and have assets in excess of £1,000m.

- (i) Money Market Funds (MMFs) CNAV – AAA.
- (ii) Money Market Funds (MMF's) LNAV – AAA.
- (iii) Money Market Funds (MMF's) VNAV – AAA.
- (iv) Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds – AAA.
- (v) UK Government (including gilts, Treasury Bills and the DMADF).
- (vi) Local authorities, parish councils etc.
- (vii) Supranational institutions.
- (viii) Housing associations.
- (ix) Property Funds, Corporate Bond Funds and Asset Backed Investment Products.

79. A limit of £50m will be applied to the use of non-specified investments.

### **Use of additional information other than credit ratings**

80. Additional requirements under the Code require the Council to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria relies primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any specific investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information (for example Credit Default Swaps, negative rating Watches/Outlooks) will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment counterparties.

### **Time and monetary limits applying to investments.**

81. In order to determine time limits for investments the Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moodys and Standard & Poors. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- (a) credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- (b) Credit Default Swap price spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- (c) sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

82. The Council will therefore use the following durational bands when applying time limits to investments

- (a) Yellow            Maximum 2 years \*This only relates to AAA rated government debt or its equivalent;
- (b) Purple           Maximum 2 years;
- (c) Blue             1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks);
- (d) Orange          1 year;
- (e) Red              6 months;
- (f) Green            3 months.

83. The time and monetary limits for institutions on the Council's counterparty list are as follows (these will cover both specified and non-specified Investments)

**Table 13 – Time and monetary limits applying to investments**

	Fitch Long term Rating (or equivalent)	Money Limit	Time Limit
Banks 1 high quality	AA-	£5m	Maximum of 2 years Suggested duration using Link Group colour coding (CDS adjusted with manual override)
Banks 1 medium quality	A	£4m	Maximum of 1 year Suggested duration using Link Group colour coding (CDS adjusted with manual override)
Banks 1 lower quality	A-	£3m	Maximum of 1 year Suggested duration using Link Group colour coding (CDS adjusted with manual override)
Banks 2 category – part nationalised	N/A	£5m	Maximum of 1 years
Banks 3 category – Council's banker (not meeting Banks 1)		£3m	1 day
DMADF (Debt Management Office)	AAA	unlimited	6 months
UK Government Treasury Bills	UK sovereign rating	unlimited	Maximum of 1 year
Local authorities	N/A	£5m per Local Authority	Up to 2 years
Money market Funds (CNAV, LVNAV & VNAV) and Ultra Short Dated Bond Funds	AAA	£5m per Fund	liquid
Property Funds, Corporate Bond Funds and other Asset backed Investment products	Non Rated Due Diligence required	£20m per Fund	10 years

84. In addition to sterling deposits either on a fixed term call or notice basis deposits in banks or Building Societies which meet our criteria, may be made via certificates of deposits where appropriate.
85. The proposed criteria for Specified and Non-Specified investments are shown in Appendix 2 for approval.
86. All credit ratings will be monitored daily. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link Group creditworthiness service.
- (a) if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.

- (b) in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

87. Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that government support.

## **Investment Strategy**

### **In-house funds**

88. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow, where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed.

- (a) If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping the most investments as being short term or variable.
- (b) Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

### **Investment returns expectations**

89. Bank Rate is unlikely to rise from 0.10% for a considerable period. It is very difficult to say when it may start rising so it may be best to assume that investment earnings from money market-related instruments will be sub 0.50% for the foreseeable future.

90. The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:-

- (a) 2020/21 0.10%
- (b) 2021/22 0.10%
- (c) 2022/23 0.10%
- (d) 2023/24 0.25%
- (e) 2024/25 0.75%
- (f) Later years 2.00%

91. The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably relatively even, but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus. It may also be affected by what deal the UK agrees as part of Brexit.

92. There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates until 2023/24 at the earliest.

### **Negative Investment Rates**

93. While the Bank of England said in August / September 2020 that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, at least in the next 6 -12 months, some deposit accounts are already offering negative rates for shorter periods. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis; this has caused some local authorities to have sudden large increases in cash balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short term until those sums were able to be passed on.
94. As for money market funds (MMFs), yields have continued to drift lower. Some managers have already resorted to trimming fee levels to ensure that net yields for investors remain in positive territory where possible and practical. Investor cash flow uncertainty, and the need to maintain liquidity in these unprecedented times, has meant there is a surfeit of money swilling around at the very short end of the market. This has seen a number of market operators, now including the DMADF, offer nil or negative rates for very short term maturities. This is not universal, and MMFs are still offering a marginally positive return, as are a number of financial institutions for investments at the very short end of the yield curve.
95. Inter-local authority lending and borrowing rates have also declined due to the surge in the levels of cash seeking a short-term home at a time when many local authorities are probably having difficulties over accurately forecasting when disbursements of funds received will occur or when further large receipts will be received from the Government.

### **Investment treasury indicator and limit**

96. Total principal funds invested for greater than 365 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.
97. Cabinet is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit: -

**Table 14 – Maximum Principal sums invested**

	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
Principal sums invested greater than 365 days	£50m	£50m	£50m

98. For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its instant access accounts, 30+ day notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to three months) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.



## Investment Risk Benchmarking

99. These benchmarks are simple guides to maximum risk, so they may be breached from time to time, depending on movements in interest rates and counterparty criteria. They relate to Investments that are not Property Funds. The purpose of the benchmark is that officers will monitor the current and trend position and amend the operational strategy to manage risk as conditions change. Any breach of the benchmarks will be reported, with supporting reasons in the Mid-Year or Annual Report.

100. Security - The Council's maximum security risk benchmark for the current portfolio, when compared to these historic default tables, is:

0.077% historic risk of default when compared to the whole portfolio.

101. Liquidity – in respect of this area the Council seeks to maintain:

- (a) Bank overdraft - £0.100m;
- (b) Liquid short-term deposits of at least £3.000m available with a week's notice;
- (c) Weighted Average Life benchmark is expected to be 1 year.

102. Yield - local measures of yield benchmarks are:

- (a) Investments – internal returns above the 7-day LIBID rate;
- (b) Investments – Longer term – capital investment rates returned against comparative average rates.

103. In addition that the security benchmark for each individual year is:

**Table 15 - Security Benchmark**

	1 year	2 years
<b>Maximum</b>	0.077%	0.077%

Note: This benchmark is an average risk of default measure and would not constitute an expectation of loss against a particular investment.

The Council is appreciative that the provision of LIBOR and associated LIBID rates is expected to cease at the end of 2021. It will work with its advisors in determining suitable replacement investment benchmark(s) ahead of this cessation and will report back to members accordingly.

104. The above reported benchmarks for Security Liquidity and Yield all relate to Deposits with Banks and Money Market Funds but would not relate to Property Funds.

105. It is proposed that property funds will be benchmarked for performance against the IPD All Balanced Fund index which is the universe of all property funds, data for this can be provided by our Treasury Management advisors Link Group.

**End of year investment report**

106. At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

## APPENDIX 1

### Economic Background provided by Link Group

1. UK. The key quarterly meeting of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee kept Bank Rate unchanged on 5<sup>th</sup> November. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5<sup>th</sup> November to 2<sup>nd</sup> December which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that "announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target".
  - (a) Its forecasts appeared, at the time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:
    - (i) The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022;
    - (ii) The Bank also expected there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
    - (iii) CPI inflation was therefore projected to be a bit above its 2% target by the start of 2023 and the "inflation risks were judged to be balanced".
2. Significantly, there was no mention of negative interest rates in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it "stands ready to adjust monetary policy", the MPC this time said that it will take "whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit". The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank's willingness to embrace new tools.
3. One key addition to the Bank's forward guidance in August was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that "it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% target sustainably". That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years' time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase, (or decrease), through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years due as it will take some years to eliminate spare capacity in the economy, and therefore for inflationary pressures to rise to cause the MPC concern. Inflation is expected to briefly peak at just over 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern.
4. However, the minutes did contain several references to downside risks. The MPC reiterated that the "recovery would take time, and the risks around the GDP

projection were judged to be skewed to the downside". It also said "the risk of a more persistent period of elevated unemployment remained material". Downside risks could well include severe restrictions remaining in place in some form during the rest of December and most of January too. Upside risks included the early roll out of effective vaccines.

5. COVID-19 vaccines. We had been waiting expectantly for news that various COVID-19 vaccines would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9th November was very encouraging as its 90% effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60% rate of effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, this vaccine has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70C that impairs the speed of application to the general population. It has therefore been particularly welcome that the Oxford University/AstraZeneca vaccine has now also been approved which is much cheaper and only requires fridge temperatures for storage. The Government has 60m doses on order and is aiming to vaccinate at a rate of 2m people per week starting in January, though this rate is currently restricted by a bottleneck on vaccine production; (a new UK production facility is due to be completed in June).
6. These announcements, plus expected further announcements that other vaccines will be approved soon, have enormously boosted confidence that life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels; this would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could begin to be eased, beginning possibly in Q2 2021, once vulnerable people and front-line workers have been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7% in 2021 instead of 9%. Public borrowing was forecast in November by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.

7. Public borrowing is now forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.
8. Overall, the pace of recovery was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp after quarter 1 saw growth at -3.0% followed by -18.8% in quarter 2 and then an upswing of +16.0% in quarter 3; this still left the economy 8.6% smaller than in Q4 2019. It is likely that the one month national lockdown that started on 5<sup>th</sup> November, will have caused a further contraction of 8% m/m in November so the economy may have then been 14% below its pre-crisis level.
9. December 2020 / January 2021. Since then, there has been a rapid back tracking on easing restrictions due to the spread of a new mutation of the virus by the imposition of severe restrictions across all four nations. These restrictions were changed on January 5<sup>th</sup> to national lockdowns of various initial lengths in each of the four nations as the NHS was under extreme pressure. It is now likely that wide swathes of the UK will remain under severe restrictions for some months; this means that the near-term outlook for the economy is grim. However, the distribution of vaccines and the expected consequent removal of COVID-19 restrictions, should allow GDP to rebound rapidly in the second half of 2021 so that the economy could climb back to its pre-pandemic peak as soon as late in 2022. Provided that both monetary and fiscal policy are kept loose for a few years yet, then it is still possible that in the second half of this decade, the economy may be no smaller than it would have been if COVID-19 never happened. The significant caveat is that another mutation of COVID-19 does not appear that defeats the current batch of vaccines. However, now that science and technology have caught up with understanding this virus, new vaccines ought to be able to be developed more quickly to counter such a development and vaccine production facilities are being ramped up around the world.
10. This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to around 2.5% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR's most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts assumed that there is a reasonable Brexit deal and also that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, (perversely!), depress economic growth and recovery.

11. There will be some painful longer term adjustments as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services are one area that has already seen huge growth.
12. Brexit. While the UK has been gripped by the long running saga of whether or not a deal would be made by 31st December, the final agreement on December 24th, followed by ratification by Parliament and all 27 EU countries in the following week, has eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covers trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. As the forecasts in this report were based on an assumption of a Brexit agreement being reached, there is no need to amend these forecasts.
13. Monetary Policy Committee meeting of 17 December. All nine Committee members voted to keep interest rates on hold at +0.10% and the Quantitative Easing (QE) target at £895bn. The MPC commented that the successful rollout of vaccines had reduced the downsides risks to the economy it had highlighted in November. But this was caveated by it saying "Although all members agreed that this would reduce downside risks, they placed different weights on the degree to which this was also expected to lead to stronger GDP growth in the central case." So, while the vaccine is a positive development, in the eyes of the MPC at least, the economy is far from out of the woods. As a result of these continued concerns, the MPC voted to extend the availability of the Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for small and medium size enterprises for six months from 30th April until 31st October 2021. (The MPC had assumed that a Brexit deal would be agreed).
  - (a) **Fiscal policy.** In the same week as the MPC meeting, the Chancellor made a series of announcements to provide further support to the economy: -
    - (i) An extension of the COVID-19 loan schemes from the end of January 2021 to the end of March.
    - (ii) The furlough scheme was lengthened from the end of March to the end of April.
    - (iii) The Budget on 3rd March 2021 will lay out the "next phase of the plan to tackle the virus and protect jobs". This does not sound like tax rises are imminent, (which could hold back the speed of economic recovery).
14. The **Financial Policy Committee** (FPC) report on 6<sup>th</sup> August revised down their expected credit losses for the banking sector to "somewhat less than £80bn". It stated that in its assessment "banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC's central projection". The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC's projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.

15. US - The result of the November elections means that while the Democrats gained the presidency and a majority in the House of Representatives, it looks as if the Republicans could retain their slim majority in the Senate provided they keep hold of two key seats in Georgia in elections in early January. If those two seats do swing to the Democrats, they will then control both Houses and President Biden will consequently have a free hand to determine policy and to implement his election manifesto.
16. The economy had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the pandemic with GDP only 3.5% below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7%. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a fourth wave. While the first wave in March and April was concentrated in the Northeast, and the second wave in the South and West, the third wave in the Midwest looks as if it is now abating. However, it looks as if the virus is rising again in the rest of the country. The latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is the single biggest downside risk to the shorter term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.
17. The restrictions imposed to control its spread are once again weighing on the economy with employment growth slowing sharply in November and retail sales dropping back. The economy is set for further weakness in December and into the spring. However, a \$900bn fiscal stimulus deal passed by Congress in late December will limit the downside through measures which included a second round of direct payments to households worth \$600 per person and a three-month extension of enhanced unemployment insurance (including a \$300 weekly top-up payment for all claimants). GDP growth is expected to rebound markedly from the second quarter of 2021 onwards, as vaccines are rolled out on a widespread basis and restrictions are loosened.
18. After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time."* This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that officials expect to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China

is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal.

19. The Fed's meeting on 5 November was unremarkable - but at a politically sensitive time around the elections. At its 16 December meeting the Fed tweaked the guidance for its asset purchases in the statement issued after the conclusion of today's FOMC meeting, with the new language implying those purchases could continue for longer than previously believed. Nevertheless, with officials still projecting that inflation will only get back to 2.0% in 2023, the vast majority expect the fed funds rate to be still at near-zero until 2024 or later. Furthermore, the new rate forecast tables reveal that officials think the balance of risks surrounding that median inflation forecast are firmly skewed to the downside. The key message is still that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases – continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping Treasury yields low – which will also have an influence on gilt yields in this country.
20. **EU.** In early December, the figures for Q3 GDP confirmed that the economy staged a rapid rebound from the first lockdowns. This provides grounds for optimism about growth prospects for next year. In Q2, GDP was 15% below its pre-pandemic level. But in Q3 the economy grew by 12.5% q/q leaving GDP down by “only” 4.4%. That was much better than had been expected earlier in the year. However, growth is likely to stagnate during Q4, and in Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries: it is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the worst affected countries.
21. With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, the ECB has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. The ECB's December meeting added a further €500bn to the PEPP scheme (purchase of government and other bonds), and extended the duration of the programme to March 2022 and re-investing maturities until December 2023. Three additional tranches of TLTRO (cheap loans to banks) were approved, indicating that support will last beyond the impact of the pandemic, implying indirect yield curve control for government bonds for some time ahead. The Bank's forecast for a return to pre-virus activity levels was pushed back to the end of 2021, but stronger growth is projected in 2022.
22. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support.
23. However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle before quarter 2 of 2021.
24. **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus



and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies.

25. However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.
26. **Japan.** A third round of stimulus in early December took total fresh fiscal spending this year in response to the virus close to 12% of pre-virus GDP. That's huge by past standards, and one of the largest national fiscal responses. The budget deficit is now likely to reach 16% of GDP this year. Coupled with Japan's relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the likelihood of effective vaccines being available in the coming months, the government's latest fiscal arrow should help ensure a strong recovery and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3 2021 – around the same time as the US and much sooner than the Eurozone.
27. **World growth.** World growth will have been in recession in 2020. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus.
28. Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

## Summary

29. **Central banks are, therefore, likely to come under more pressure to support growth by looser monetary policy measures and this is likely to result in**

**more quantitative easing and keeping rates very low for longer. It will also put pressure on governments to provide more fiscal support for their economies.**

30. **If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.**

## **INTEREST RATE FORECASTS**

31. **Brexit.** The interest rate forecasts provided by Link in the main report were predicated on an assumption of a reasonable agreement being reached on trade negotiations between the UK and the EU by 31.12.20. There is therefore no need to revise these forecasts now that a trade deal has been agreed.
32. Brexit may reduce the economy's potential growth rate in the long run. However, much of that drag is now likely to be offset by an acceleration of productivity growth triggered by the digital revolution brought about by the COVID crisis.

## **The balance of risks to the UK**

33. The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is still subject to some uncertainty due to the virus and the effect of any mutations, and how quick vaccines are in enabling a relaxation of restrictions.
34. There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

## **Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:**

35. UK government takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand in the economy.
36. UK - Bank of England takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
37. A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for "weaker" countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next two or three years. However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its

already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.

38. Weak capitalisation of some European banks, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.
39. German minority government & general election in 2021. In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in subsequent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she intends to remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.
40. Other minority EU governments. Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
41. Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU. In November, Hungary and Poland threatened to veto the 7 year EU budget until a compromise was thrashed out in late 2020. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
42. Geopolitical risks, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

#### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates**

43. UK - a significant rise in inflationary pressures e.g. caused by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population, leading to a rapid resumption of normal life and return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.
44. The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.

## APPENDIX 2

### **Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) – Credit and Counterparty Risk Management**

1. The MHCLG issued Investment Guidance in 2018, and this forms the structure of the Council's policy below. These guidelines do not apply to either trust funds or pension funds which operate under a different regulatory regime.
2. The key intention of the Guidance is to maintain the current requirement for Councils to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective the guidance requires this Council to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes. This Council adopted the Code on 21<sup>st</sup> March 2002 and will apply its principles to all investment activity. In accordance with the Code, the Assistant Director Resources has produced its Treasury Management Practices (TMPs). This part, TMP 1(1), covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year.

### **Annual Investment Strategy**

3. The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of its annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of the following:
  - (a) The strategy guidelines for choosing and placing investments, particularly non-specified investments.
  - (b) The principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed.
  - (c) Specified investments that the Council will use. These are high security (i.e. high credit rating, although this is defined by the Council, and no guidelines are given), and high liquidity investments in sterling and with a maturity of no more than a year.
  - (d) Non-specified investments, clarifying the greater risk implications, identifying the general types of investment that may be used and a limit to the overall amount of various categories that can be held at any time.
4. The investment policy proposed for the Council is:

### **Strategy Guidelines**

5. The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement.

## All Investments

6. The criteria for providing a pool of high quality investment counterparties (both Specified and Non-specified investments) is:
  - (a) Banks 1 - good credit quality – the Council will only use banks which:
    - (i) are UK banks; and have, as a minimum, the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors credit ratings (where rated):
      1. Fitch Short Term equivalent – F1;
      2. Fitch Long term equivalent – A-.
  - (b) Banks 2 Non UK banks based on the following very high quality criteria using a lowest common denominator approach and only where sovereign ratings are AAA.
    - (i) Fitch Short Term equivalent – F1+;
    - (ii) Fitch Long Term equivalent – AA-.
  - (c) Banks 3 – Part nationalised UK banks – Lloyds Bank Group and Royal Bank of Scotland. These banks can be included if they continue to be part nationalised or they meet the ratings in Banks 1 above.
  - (d) Banks 4 – The Council's own banker for transactional purposes if the bank falls below the above criteria, although in this case balances will be minimised in both monetary size and time.
  - (e) Building societies The Council will use all societies which:
    - (i) meet the ratings for banks outlined above and have assets in excess of £1,000m.
  - (f) Money Market Funds (CNAV, LVNAV & VNAV) AAA.
  - (g) Ultra Short Dated Bond Funds AAA.
  - (h) UK Government (including gilts Treasury Bills and the Debt Management Office).
  - (i) Local authorities, parish councils etc.
  - (j) Supranational institutions.
  - (k) Property Funds ,Corporate Bond Funds and Asset Backed Investment Products.
7. A limit of £50M will be applied to the use of Non-Specified investments.

## **Specified Investments**

8. These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity, or those which could be for a longer period but where the Council has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes. These are considered low risk assets where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. These would include sterling investments which would not be defined as capital expenditure with:
  - (a) The UK Government (such as the Debt Management Account deposit facility, UK Treasury Bills or a Gilt with less than one year to maturity).
  - (b) Supranational bonds of less than one year's duration.
  - (c) A local authority, housing association, parish council or community council.
  - (d) Pooled investment vehicles (such as money market funds) that have been awarded a high credit rating by a credit rating agency. For category f. above, this covers pooled investment vehicles, such as money market funds, rated AAA by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and/or Fitch rating agencies.
  - (e) A body that is considered of a high credit quality (such as a bank or building society). For category a and b this covers bodies with a minimum short term rating of F1 (or the equivalent) as rated by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and/or Fitch rating agencies.
9. Within these bodies, and in accordance with the Code, the Council has set additional criteria to set the time and amount of monies which will be invested in these bodies. These criteria are:

	Fitch Long term Rating (or equivalent)	Money Limit	Time Limit
<b>Banks 1 category high quality</b>	<b>AA-</b>	<b>£5M</b>	<b>Maximum of 2 years Suggested duration using Link Asset Services colour coding (CDS adjusted with manual override)</b>
<b>Banks 1 category medium quality</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>£4M</b>	<b>Maximum of 1 year Suggested duration using Link Asset Services colour coding (CDS adjusted with manual override)</b>
<b>Banks 1 category lower quality</b>	<b>A-</b>	<b>£3M</b>	<b>Maximum of 1 year Suggested duration using Link Asset Services colour coding (CDS adjusted with manual override)</b>
<b>Banks 2 Non UK (only where sovereign ratings are AAA)</b>	<b>AA-</b>	<b>£3M</b>	<b>Maximum of 1 year Suggested duration using Link Asset Services colour coding (CDS adjusted with manual override)</b>
<b>Banks 3 category – part nationalised</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>£5M</b>	<b>Maximum of 1 year</b>
<b>Banks 4 category – Council's banker (not meeting Banks 1,2 and3)</b>		<b>£3M</b>	<b>1 day</b>
<b>DMADF (Debt Management Office)</b>	<b>AAA</b>	<b>unlimited</b>	<b>6 months</b>
<b>Local authorities</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>£5M per Local Authority</b>	<b>Up to 1 years</b>
<b>Money market Funds (CNAV, LVNAV &amp; VNAV) and Ultra Short Dated Bond Funds</b>	<b>AAA</b>	<b>£5M per Fund</b>	<b>liquid</b>

10. The Council will therefore use the following durational bands supplied by Link Asset Service's creditworthiness service when applying time limits to investments:

- (a) Yellow      Maximum 2 years \*This only relates to AAA rated government debt or its equivalent;
- (b) Purple      Maximum 2 years.
- (c) Blue        1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks).
- (d) Orange     1 year.
- (e) Red         6 months.
- (f) Green       3 months.

## Non-Specified Investments

11. Non-specified investments are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined as Specified above). The identification and rationale supporting the selection of these other investments and the maximum limits to be applied are set out below. Non specified investments would include any sterling investments with:

	Non Specified Investment Category	Limit (£ or %)
a.	<p><b>Supranational Bonds greater than 1 year to maturity</b></p> <p><b>(a) Multilateral development bank bonds</b> - These are bonds defined as an international financial institution having as one of its objects economic development, either generally or in any region of the world (e.g. European Reconstruction and Development Bank etc.).</p> <p><b>(b) A financial institution that is guaranteed by the United Kingdom Government</b> (e.g. National Rail, The Guaranteed Export Finance Company {GEFCO})</p> <p>The security of interest and principal on maturity is on a par with the Government and so very secure. These bonds usually provide returns above equivalent gilt edged securities. However the value of the bond may rise or fall before maturity and losses may accrue if the bond is sold before maturity.</p>	AAA long term ratings
b.	<p><b>Gilt edged securities</b> with a maturity of greater than one year. These are Government bonds and so provide the highest security of interest and the repayment of principal on maturity. Similar to category (a) above, the value of the bond may rise or fall before maturity and losses may accrue if the bond is sold before maturity.</p>	
c.	<p><b>The Council's own banker</b> if it fails to meet the basic credit criteria. In this instance balances will be minimised as far as is possible.</p>	£3m
d.	<p><b>Building societies not meeting the basic security requirements under the specified investments.</b> The operation of some building societies does not require a credit rating, although in every other respect the security of the society would match similarly sized societies with ratings.</p>	£5m
e.	<p>Any <b>bank or building society</b> that has a minimum long term credit rating of AA-, for deposits with a maturity of greater than one year (including forward deals in excess of one year from inception to repayment).</p>	£5m
f.	<p><b>Local Authorities</b></p>	£5m per authority
g.	<p><b>Property Funds, Corporate Bond Funds and Other Asset backed Investment products</b></p> <p>The use of these instruments can be deemed to be capital expenditure, and as such will be an application (spending) of capital resources. This Authority will seek guidance on the status of any fund it may consider using</p>	£20m per Fund

12. Within categories c and d, and in accordance with the Code, the Council has developed additional criteria to set the overall amount of monies which will be



invested in these bodies. Time limits will be applied to banks using the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. And for part-nationalised banks will be up to 2 years.

13. Time limits for Property Funds, Corporate Bond Funds and Asset Backed Investment Products will be up to 10 Years, Local Authorities up to 2 years.

### **The Monitoring of Investment Counterparties**

14. The credit rating of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The Council receives credit rating information (changes, rating watches and rating outlooks) from Link Asset Services as and when ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the Assistant Director Resources, and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.